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In this research paper, the dynamic trade-off theory is tested by applying
European public and private firms, since as much of the existing research remains in the US
public firm context only. The results of our research show that European firms, both private
and public, follow the optimal capital structure path consistent with the dynamic trade-off
theory. We find that above optimally levered firms adjust their leverage towards the optimal
capital structure faster than the below optimally levered ones. In addition, the results show
that public and private firms seem to make similar leverage adjustment decisions and that
there are the size of the firms and the public/private status that account for the differences.
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1

INTRODUCTION

Despite capital structure decisions being one of the most extensively studied topics in
corporate finance, no consensus has been reached about the main forces driving a corporate
capital structure choice. One group of researches argues that firms aim at operating with an
optimal capital structure that is found by trading-off the benefits and the costs of debt, as
put forward by Modigliani and Miller (1963), while others argue in favour of the peckingorder theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984) which refutes the existence of the optimal capital
structure and suggests that financing is driven by asymmetric information on the financial
markets and the resulting pecking-order of the financing choices. The third theory of
capital structure suggests that capital structure is merely a result of previous market timing
attempts as firms raise capital when conditions on the market are favourable (Baker and
Wurgler, 2002). Only recently have some authors (Byoun, 2008; Faulkender et al., 2012)
tried to merge these theories in a unified capital structure framework in which factors
proposed by alternative theories interact.
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The dynamic trade-off theory hypothesizes that the firm’s debt-equity mix often deviates
from the target leverage because firms face substantial adjustment costs when rebalancing
their capital structures (Fischer et al., 1989). If adjustment costs exceed the benefits of
operating with the optimal capital structure, firms are not motivated to adjust their
leverage. Thus, firms rebalance only if their actual leverage diverges from the target leverage
substantially (Strebulaev, 2007). A unified theory of capital structure adds to the dynamic
trade-off theory model by proposing other possible leverage adjustment scenarios, which
stem from the pecking-order theory and the market timing theory. The dynamic tradeoff theory has been widely empirically tested so far, however, researchers have mainly
addressed US public firms (Fama and French, 2002; Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Kayhan
and Titman, 2007; Byoun, 2008; Huang and Ritter, 2009; Cook and Tang, 2010). Based on
the empirical findings, one can conclude that the dynamic trade-off theory that assumes a
partial convergence of leverage towards the firm’s optimal capital structure is a prevalent
explanation of the capital structure choice and leverage dynamics in practice.
In this paper, the optimal capital structure choice and leverage adjustment speed of
European firms is investigated. In addition to public firms, we address also private firms.
Both the selected European as well as private firms have received significantly less attention
in the literature so far. By addressing a large sample of public and private European firms,
we contribute to the existing literature by providing further empirical tests of the dynamic
trade-off theory outside the context of the US firms and large public firms. Based on the
scarce available literature, one could infer that the capital structure choice of European
firms does not depart from the practices observed in the US firms. However, the extant
literature does not provide a conclusive answer whether the capital structure choice and
leverage adjustment process differ in public and private firms. Lemmon et al. (2008),
Hanousek and Shamshur (2011), and Marinšek et al. (2016), for example, found that the
capital structure decisions of public firms do not differ from the decisions in private firms,
while Bartholdy and Mateus (2011), and Goyal et al. (2011) provide the opposite findings.
To gain further insights into the capital structure choice and leverage adjustment process
of the European private firms, we address a significantly larger sample than those used in
similar studies. In addition to the robustness test of the theory for private firms, this allows
us to test the theory for firms of different sizes.
Our empirical models build on a unified setting in which the leverage target is consistent
with the dynamic trade-off theory, while the leverage adjustment process depends on the
interacting effects proposed by various capital structure theories, especially the peckingorder theory. The approach follows the idea of Gaud et al. (2007) who found that the capital
structure choice of European firms cannot be sufficiently explained by relying solely on
the rationale of one capital structure theory alone. In our research, the unified capital
structure framework is tested by first predicting the firms’ optimal capital structure using
the optimal capital structure model. Then, the gap between the target and actual leverage is
calculated. Knowing this gap and the change of leverage in the period allows us to analyse
the leverage adjustment process, i.e. to estimate the leverage adjustment speed. As argued
by Byoun (2008), the pecking-order theory provides us with an additional explanation
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of the leverage adjustment process, as it was found that the leverage adjustment speed
depends also on the firm’s cash flow imbalances. We expand Byoun’s view by hypothesising
that the effect of the firm’s cash flow imbalances could also be analysed from the tradeoff theory perspective, which is related to the findings of Strebulaev (2007). However, as
recognised in many previous capital structure studies, these two approaches should not be
understood as mutually exclusive.3 We also analyse the impact of the financial crisis that
emerged in 2008 on the leverage adjustment process. According to Goyal et al. (2011),
the existing literature assumes infinitely elastic supply of debt and equity, which leaves no
room for the market timing arguments. Conversely, Cook and Tang (2010), and Dang et
al. (2014) argue that a reduction of the leverage adjustment speed is likely to occur in a
stressed economic environment, which provides evidence that external market forces are
important capital structure determinants too.
In our empirical study, we found strong empirical evidence that European firms adjust
their leverage towards the optimal capital structure and that both public and private firms
have a similar leverage adjustment speed. The results show that the above optimally levered
firms adjust towards the target leverage faster than the below optimally levered firms.
Investigating the impact of the firm’s cash flow imbalances on the leverage adjustment
process, we found that it should be studied from both the trade-off and the pecking-order
perspectives. In addition to providing the evidence for the robustness of the theory outside
of the context of the US large public firms, it was found that the leverage adjustment speed
depends significantly on the size of the private firm. Moreover, the results show that
the leverage adjustment speed is related more to the size of the firm than to the public/
private status of the firm. Somewhat in contrast to our expectations, smaller firms adjust
their leverage towards the optimum faster than larger firms, and we observe an opposite
asymmetry in the adjustment speed in the group of the smallest private firms as the
adjustment speed of the bellow optimally levered firms exceeds the adjustment speed of
the above optimally levered firms.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, the literature is reviewed, in
section 3, the empirical models and estimation techniques described, in section 4, the
collected data analysed, in section 5, the results presented, and in section 6, concluding
remarks provided.

3 The interacting effects of alternative theories have been found also when studying security issuance. See, for
example, Dong et al. (2012) who show how the effects of market timing and the pecking order interact when a
firm issues and repurchases equity.
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2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The trade-off theory describes the optimal capital structure choice as a process of weighing
the benefits and costs of debt financing. The benefits of debt result from the interest tax
shield (Modigliani and Miller, 1963). Debt also mitigates the agency conflict between
managers and shareholders and reduces the free cash flow problem (Jensen, 1986). The
costs of debt financing refer to the costs of financial distress (Baxter, 1967) and agency
costs related to the underinvestment problem and debt overhang problem (Myers, 1977).
According to the static trade-off theory, a firm estimates its optimal capital structure, i.e.
capital structure that maximizes the value of the firm, and then adjusts the leverage to adopt
the optimal debt-equity mix. The static trade-off theory, however, ignores the adjustment
costs that make firms reluctant to continuously adjust their capital structure and operate
with the optimal capital structure. Fischer et al. (1989) show that even low adjustment costs
lead to a wide capital structure interval that is optimal for the firm, in contrast to a precise
estimate of the optimal debt-equity mix and the required continuous rebalancing. Leary
and Roberts (2005) show that because of the adjustment cost, firms rebalance their capital
structure only infrequently. Strebulaev (2007) argues that even though a firm follows the
optimal capital structure path and converges to the target leverage, the actual leverage is
likely to deviate from the target leverage most of the time, as the adjustments occur only
in the refinancing points.
The alternative pecking-order hypothesis is built on another key capital market
imperfection. Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that because of asymmetric information and
the transaction costs faced by the firms when raising capital, the firm’s financing process
follows a pecking-order. According to the pecking-order, firms always first exhaust all
internal financing resources and when external sources are required, firms first issue debt,
while they choose to issue equity only as the last resort option. Consequently, there is
no optimal capital structure in a pecking-order explanation of the firm’s capital structure
choice. Bessler et al. (2011) explain the pecking-order behaviour also in a dynamic context
in which information asymmetry is time varying and firms have more external financing
options than in the static pecking-order hypothesis. As opposed to the static peckingorder hypothesis, equity issues are not discouraged. Probability of issuing equity increases
with the fall in the firm-level information asymmetry and firms exploit such opportunities
for large equity offerings to build up cash reserves. The fall in the firm-level information
asymmetry can be a consequence of a share price increase (decrease in the relative value
of information asymmetry) or the firm’s previous information disclosures needed for
accessing external financial resources.
Most of researchers agree that the dynamic trade-off theory that assumes a partial
convergence of leverage towards the firm’s optimal capital structure is a prevalent
explanation of the capital structure choice and leverage dynamics in practice. This
behaviour is inter alia empirically confirmed by Fama and French (2002), Flannery
and Rangan (2006), Kayhan and Titman (2007), and Huang and Ritter (2009) who all
show that the US public firms adjust their leverage towards the optimal capital structure.
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However, Lemmon et al. (2008) found that sub-optimally levered firms, operating with
above or below optimal leverage, even though they converge to the target on a long run,
remain sub-optimally levered for a long time. Byoun (2008) shows that firms operating
with above optimal leverage adjust their leverage faster than the firms operating with
below optimal leverage. He also shows that the adjustment speed depends on the firm’s
cash flow imbalances, as it looks like that firms that operate with above optimal leverage
adjust their leverage faster when having a financial surplus, while firms that operate with
below optimal leverage adjust faster when having a financial deficit. Similar findings were
obtained by Faulkender et al. (2012) who show that firms with ample operating cash flow
make larger leverage adjustments than firms with low operating cash flow. By studying the
impact of cash flow imbalances on the leverage adjustment process, both Byoun (2008)
and Faulkender et al. (2012) attempt to develop a unified capital structure framework that
incorporates the elements of both alternative capital structure theories.
Compared to the empirical studies addressing the US public firms, the literature
investigating European firms and private firms is rather scarce. What is more, there is
mixed evidence available whether private firms exhibit the behaviour proposed by the
dynamic trade-off theory. In a recent study, Marinšek et al. (2016) who addressed the EU
public and private firms found that the leverage adjustment speed towards the optimal
capital structure is similar for firms regardless of their size, public/private status, ownership
structure and origin. Similar findings were obtained by Hanousek and Shamshur (2011)
who addressed private firms from the European transition economies. On the other
hand, Bartholdy and Mateus (2011) argue that small private firms that are predominantly
bank-financed differ from large public firms in terms of agency problem and information
asymmetry. Therefore, they conclude that their behaviour cannot be explained by the
determinants used to model the capital structure choice of large public firms. Brav (2009)
argues that private firms rely exclusively on debt financing when raising capital and that
their capital structures are very sensitive to fluctuations in their performance. The same
argument was brought forward by Goyal et al. (2011), and Saunders and Steffen (2011).
We conclude this literature review with the contributions studying the impact of the
macroeconomic conditions and the conditions on the financial market on the capital
structure choice. Cook and Tang (2010) show that US firms adjust their leverage towards
the optimal capital structure faster in times of good macroeconomic conditions than in
times of crisis. Dang et al. (2014) found that the impact of the recent financial crisis on
the leverage adjustment speed is asymmetric as financially constrained firms experience
more pronounced reduction in the leverage adjustment speed than unconstrained firms,
while Caglayan and Rashid (2014) show that the macroeconomic risk affects public and
private firms’ leverage choices similarly. Öztekin and Flannery (2012) link firms’ leverage
adjustment speed to the legal, institutional and financial development of particular
countries. They show that firms in the US, the UK, Canada and New Zealand exhibit a
significantly higher leverage adjustment speed than firms from South America or Central
Asia.
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3

EMPIRICAL MODELS AND ESTIMATION TECHNIQUES

The dynamic trade-off theory is empirically examined by analysing the leverage adjustment
process towards the optimal capital structure. To estimate the leverage adjustment speed,
one needs to first estimate the firm’s optimal capital structure and then analyse the firm’s
actual leverage and the convergence towards the target leverage. Following the existing
literature (Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Byoun, 2008), the optimal capital structure model
in which leverage is approximated with 1) long-term debt ratio and 2) total debt ratio has
the following form:4
LEV(1,2)i,t= α+ β1 ✳ TANGi,t + β2 ✳ SIZEi,t + β3 ✳ GROWTHi,t + β4 ✳ PROFi,t
+ β5 ✳ DEPi,t + β6 ✳ R&Di,t + β7 ✳ R&DDUMi,t + β8 ✳ LIQi,t + β9
✳ MLEVi,t-1 + εi,t

(1)

Table 1: Optimal capital structure determinants
Variable

Definition

Expected correlation to leverage

TANG

Positive correlation; tangible assets can be used as a
collateral that retains value also in liquidation of a
firm and helps to mitigate agency costs of debt (Rajan
and Zingales, 1995).

SIZE

Positive correlation; large firms tend to be more
transparent and/or more diversified than small
firms and thus associated with lower information
asymmetry (Titman and Wessels, 1988).

GROWTH

Negative correlation; because of the underinvestment
problem (Myers, 1977). We use GROWTH as an
alternative to market-to-book ratio as market values
of equity is not available for private firms.

PROF

Positive correlation; according to the static trade-off
theory of capital structure, leverage provides the
interest tax shield (Modigliani and Miller, 1963).
However, empirical tests (Rajan and Zingales,
1995; Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999; Fama and
French, 2002) usually indicate negative correlation.
The reason is the pecking-order explanation of
the financing process, however, Strebulaev (2007)
shows that the negative correlation results also
in the dynamic trade-off setting as firms do not
continuously adjust their capital structures.

DEP

Negative correlation; depreciation provides a tax
shield similar to the interest tax shield (DeAngelo and
Masulis, 1980).

4 Long-term debt ratio is defined as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets, while total debt ratio includes
long-term and short-term debt.
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R&D

Negative correlation; firms with more R&D expenses
are less levered because of higher information
asymmetry (Flannery and Rangan, 2006). R&D is set
to 0 in case of missing R&D data.

LIQ

Negative correlation in case of total debt; internal
liquid funds diminish the need for short-term
borrowing (Öztekin and Flannery, 2012).
Positive correlation in case of long-term debt; current
assets can be easily collateralized (Korgaonkar and
Nini, 2010).

MLEV(t-1)

Positive correlation; lagged median debt ratio proxy
for industry specific effects that proved to be an
important determinant of optimal capital structure
(Bradley et al. 1984).

In a perfect capital market, where there are no market frictions and costs associated with
capital structure adjustments, firms always maintain the optimal capital structure. Though
in real world, where adjustment costs are significant, firms are expected to operate with
sub-optimal leverage, as departures from the target leverage are associated with lower
costs than continuous readjustments (Fischer et al., 1989; Flannery and Rangan, 2006). We
estimate the leverage adjustment speed using a partial adjustment model, similar to those
used by Byoun (2008) and Hovakimian and Li (2011). The model has the following form:
LEVi,t – LEVi,t-1 = α+ λ ✳ (LEVi,t* – LEVi,t-1) + εi,t

(2)

where LEVi,t – LEVi,t-1 is the change of the firm’s leverage in period t (year), LEVi,t* – LEVi,t-1
is the difference between the target leverage in period t (year) and actual leverage in
period t – 1 (previous year), and λ is the leverage adjustment speed to be estimated with
the model. λ shows the percentage of the gap between the firm’s actual leverage and the
optimal leverage that is closed on average per period (year). λ is expected to be on the
interval between 0 and 1. A value close to 0 means that the leverage adjustment speed
is low or almost non-existent, while a value close to 1 points to perfect capital structure
readjustments. A positive and significant λ implies that firms converge to the optimal
capital structure and provides the evidence in favour of the dynamic trade-off theory. On
the other hand, a negative λ value indicates that firms diverge from the optimal capital
structure.5
Following Byoun (2008) who argues that firms operating with above optimal leverage
adjust their leverage faster than firms operating with below optimal leverage, we estimate
the model controlling for the difference in the leverage adjustment speed of above and
below optimally levered firms:

5 One would fail to confirm the convergence of firms’ capital structure towards the optimal capital structure and
the dynamic trade-off theory also by finding λ insignificant.
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RAdji,t= α+ λ1 ✳ OAdji,t ✳ Di,tabove + λ2 ✳ OAdji,t ✳ Di,tbelow + εi,t

(3)

where RAdji,t and OAdji,t are abbreviations for LEVi,t – LEVi,t-1 and LEVi,t* – LEVi,t-1 from
equation (2), respectively. Di,tabove is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm is above
optimally levered and 0 otherwise. Di,tbelow is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the
firm is below optimally levered and 0 otherwise. λ1 is the leverage adjustment speed of
the above optimally levered firms and λ2 is the leverage adjustment speed of the below
optimally levered firms to be estimated.
Byoun (2008) and Faulkender et al. (2012) also show that the adjustment speed depends
on the firm’s cash flow imbalances. When firms operate with (high) financial deficit or
surplus adverse selection costs arising from the information asymmetry and transaction
costs of capital structure adjustments are addressed simultaneously and are consequently
lower. There are several possible outcomes of this phenomenon, each with different
implications for the leverage adjustment process. According to the traditional peckingorder hypothesis (Myers and Majluf, 1984), firms would decrease (increase) debt, if they
had a financial surplus (deficit), regardless of their leverage position relative to the optimal
capital structure. Byoun (2008) found that although the above (below) optimally levered
firms with a financial surplus (deficit) adjust faster than similar firms with a financial
deficit (surplus), the above (below) optimally levered firms with the financial deficit
(surplus) still make leverage adjustments towards the optimal capital structure. This can
be labelled as a quasi pecking-order behaviour. According to the dynamic pecking-order
theory (Bessler et al., 2011), the probability of issuing equity increases with the fall in the
firm-level information asymmetry and firms exploit such opportunities for large equity
offerings to build up cash reserves or rebalance the capital structure. Acknowledging these
various explanations, the results of the leverage adjustment process are in these specific
circumstances difficult to predict as the level of information asymmetry guides firms’
decisions either towards or away from the optimal capital structure.
It is clear that the leverage adjustment speed depends on the financial surplus and financial
deficit of the firm, however, as argued by Byoun (2008), the pecking-order theory alone
could not provide us with a complete explanation on how the leverage adjustment speed is
affected. We thus extend his framework by introducing an alternative, the trade-off based
explanation that is linked to the findings obtained by Strebulaev (2007). He argues that the
above (below) optimally levered firms with a financial deficit (surplus) adjust faster than
their peers due to the fact that they are more likely to reach the “refinancing point”, which
requires an active response from the firm.
To control for the forces beyond the traditional trade-off theory model, we test a unified
capital structure model that accommodates interactions of forces proposed by various
capital structure theories. We first calculate the firm’s financial deficit (FDi,t). A positive
value of FDi,t indicates that the firm does not generate enough internal funds to cover its
needs and that it has a financial deficit. A negative value of FDi,t indicates, on the contrary,
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that the firm has a financial surplus. We use an approach similar to the one of Kayhan
and Titman (2007) and Byoun (2008), according to which financial deficit is calculated
as follows:
FDi,t = Divi,t + Invi,t + ΔWCi,t – NIi,t

(4)

where Invi,t denotes the yearly net investment in fixed assets, ΔWCi,t is the change in the net
working capital, while NIi,t represents the net income.6
Based on the value of the firm’s financial deficit (FDi,t), we calculate two dummy variables.
The dummy variable Di,tsurplus takes value 1 if the firm has a financial surplus and is 0
otherwise. The dummy variable Di,tdeficit takes value 1 if the firm has a financial deficit and
is 0 otherwise.
A partial adjustment model that incorporates information about the firm’s cash flow
imbalances, as well as its leverage relative to the optimal capital structure, can be written
as:
RAdji,t = α + λ1 ✳ OAdji,t ✳ Di,tabove ✳ Di,tsurplus + λ2 ✳ OAdji,t ✳ Di,tabove ✳ Di,tdeficit
+ λ3 ✳ OAdji,t ✳ Di,tbelow ✳ Di,tsurplus + λ4 ✳ OAdji,t ✳ Di,tbelow ✳ Di,tdeficit + εi,t

(5)

Not least, to estimate the impact of the recent financial crisis, we expand our models from
equitation (2) and equation (3) by including a dummy variable Dtcrisis which takes the value
1 in the years after the emergence of the crisis and 0 otherwise. We expect that the leverage
adjustment speed decreases during the crisis, as the troubles in financial sector are likely
to impede availability of financial resources, while the economic downturn hampers the
firm’s profitability. Such results would show that the market timing factors related to
the external supply of debt and equity also have important implications for the capital
structure choice.
Being aware of the possible differences in the optimal capital structure choice and its
dynamics in public and private firms, we estimate the leverage adjustment speed, as well
as the optimal capital structure model separately for public and private firms. Due to the
fact that we are particularly interested in the European private firms and we expect high
heterogeneity within this group, we estimate the leverage adjustment speed also separately
for three different groups of private firms according to the size of the firm. We construct
groups based on the value of total assets; in the first group we included the firms with total
assets below 10 million EUR, in the second group we included the firms with total assets
between 10 and 100 million EUR, while the third group includes the firms with total assets
larger than 100 million EUR.
6 As we do not have data about firms’ pay-out policies, we set Divi,t = 0.
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We estimate the optimal capital structure model using a panel regression model with
fixed effects. Petersen (2009) argues that in short datasets the use of a fixed effect model
is appropriate because in such a setting it is hard to differentiate between a permanent
(fixed) effect and a temporary effect. In addition, Lemmon et al. (2008) show that the
firm’s leverage remains stable over a long period of time and that most of the variation in
leverage is time-invariant. Graham and Leary (2011), and Rauh and Sufi (2012) argue that
the firm’s fixed effect is a crucial determinant of capital structure. However, in a recent
study, DeAngelo and Roll (2015) come to a different conclusion about the capital structure
developments over the long run, but note that in the short run the capital structure
stability hypothesis is not violated. Partial adjustment models outlined in equation (2),
equation (3) and equation (5) are estimated using OLS. Due to the overlapping intervals,
the bootstrapping technique is applied to determine the statistical significance of the
estimated coefficients (Kayhan and Titman,2007).7
4

DATA

We use the data from the Bureau van Dijk’s Amadeus database. Our sample consists of
firms from EU15 countries excluding Austria, Denmark and Luxembourg because we
lack reliable information on the financial debt for the firms from these countries. The
analysis is based on an unbalanced panel for the period 2006-2012. As typical for capital
structure research, we exclude banking and insurance companies (NACE revision 2 codes
K64 and K65) for the reason of their capital structure being subject to regulatory rules,
and utility firms (NACE revision 2 codes D35 to E39) for the reason of usually operating
under special government concessions. We limit our sample to the firms that had at least
2 million EUR of total assets at the end of year 2012. Our panel consists of 1,188,762 firmyear observations and 183,130 unique firms,8 with 14,570 firm-year observations of public
firms and 1,174,192 firm-years observations of private firms.
As seen in Table 2, there are significant differences in the size of an average public and
private firm. Public firms are significantly larger on average than private firms. The
distribution of sales, net income and number of employees is skewed to the right for both
private and public firms which indicates the presence of some very large firms in both
groups.

7 The bootstrapping technique derives standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation
concerns.
8 The firm-year observations that do not contain all the variables needed for the calculation of the optimal capital
structure determinants are excluded and the data bellow and above the 1st and 99th percentile winsorized in
order to remove any outliers from our analysis.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the panel
Mean

Median

Standard Deviation

Public

2,367.252

142.669

9,860.356

Private

39.902

7.008

449.293

Public

123.944

4.402

810.308

Private

1.542

0.117

35.148

Public

9,997

725

38,322

Private

191

39

1,823

Sales (in million EUR)

Net income (in million EUR)

Number of employees*

Descriptive data correspond to 1,188,762 firm-year observations of 183,130 firms for the time period 2006-2012.
There are 14,570 firm-year observations of public firms and 1,174,192 firm-years observations of private firms.
*Descriptive statistics for number of employees is shown only for firms with available data.

In Table 3 we present descriptive statistics for the variables used in the estimation of the
optimal capital structure model. As can be seen, the public firms operate with higher
leverage than private firms, since the latter rely also on trade credit and other nonfinancial liabilities when financing their business. Moreover, the private firms tend to rely
more extensively on short-term debt than the long-term one. The median long-term debt
ratio of the studied private firms is only 3.338%, while the median total debt ratio for the
same firms is 15.365%. The fact that there are around one fifth of public and private firms
with virtually no financial debt is also important to note.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the firm-level variables used in the estimation of the optimal
capital structure model
Mean

Standard
deviation

1st
percentile

25th
percentile

Median

75th
percentile

99th
percentile

LEV1 - Long term debt / total assets (%)
Public

14.794

14.672

0

2.143

11.014

22.874

59.458

Private

10.073

14.322

0

0

3.338

15.193

61.995

LEV2 – (Long + short term debt) / total assets (%)
Public

22.291

17.578

0

7.197

20.161

33.798

67.814

Private

20.251

19.728

0

1.391

15.365

34.089

72.404

TANG – Tangible fixed assets / total assets (%)
Public

22.480

21.650

0.079

4.778

16.207

33.227

89.878

Private

24.951

23.521

0.117

5.558

17.650

38.080

92.767

SIZE – Natural logarithm of total assets
Public

19.215

2.180

19.996

17.664

18.979

20.625

24.827

Private

15.912

1.358

13.590

14.969

15.637

16.571

20.246

GROWTH - Growth rate of total assets (%)
Public

8.984

25.797

-33.355

-3.676

4.158

14.876

122.098

Private

8.042

21.696

-31.267

-4.259

4.044

15.664

91.445

PROF – EBIT / total assets (%)
Public

4.937

10.678

-38.749

1.723

5.840

10.182

27.972

Private

5.999

8.605

-17.391

1.665

4.649

9.561

33.099

DEP – Depreciation / total assets (%)
Public

4.384

4.377

0.023

2.000

3.396

5.352

21.732

Private

3.847

3.697

0.009

1.469

2.841

5.037

17.604

R&D* – R&D expenses / total assets (%)
Public

5.401

8.340

0.025

0.093

2.512

6.345

38.760

Private

5.739

12.629

0.001

0.079

2.488

6.331

43.064

LIQ – Current assets / current liabilities (%)
Public

183.476

142.049

28.697

105.741

145.043

208.670

813.922

Private

171.485

131.305

20.015

103.646

133.008

192.152

762.478

The descriptive data correspond to 1,188,762 firm-year observations of 183,130 firms for the time period from
2006 to 2012. There are 14,570 firm-year observations of public firms and 1,174,192 firm-years observations
of private firms. *Descriptive statistics for R&D are shown only for firms with available data.

The descriptive statistics show minor differences in the capital structure determinants
between the analysed public and private firms (other than firm size that has been analysed
already in Table 2). For example, private firms show to have more tangible assets and
exhibit higher profitability but grow with a slower pace than public firms.
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RESULTS

In Table 4, we present the results of the optimal capital structure model estimation
outlined in equation (1). The regression coefficients are broadly in line with the expected
correlations (presented in Table 1). All the determinants are statistically significant, except
the depreciation and R&D expenses. Although there are some differences in the size of
the effect of some determinants in public and private firms, the impacts exhibit the same
direction for almost all the determinants. The only important exception is the relationship
between the growth rate of the firm and total debt, which is positive for public firms and
negative for private firms.
Table 4: Optimal capital structure model of public and private European firms
Long-term debt
Public
TANG

0.149***
(0.011)

SIZE

0.033***
(0.002)

GROWTH

0.011***
(0.003)

PROF
DEP
R&D

-0.122***

R2
N

(0.000)
-0.094***

0.009***
(0.003)
-0.237***
(0.011)

-0.001

0.004

(0.024)

(0.004)

(0.025)

-0.078**
-0.011**
0.011***
0.197***
(0.020)

constant

0.001**

0.038***
(0.002)

(0.001)

(0.001)
MLEV(t-1)

0.034***
(0.000)

0.123***
(0.012)

-0.012

(0.005)
LIQ

0.193***
(0.001)

Public

(0.010)

(0.037)
R&DDUM

Total debt
Private

-0.552***

-0.014
(0.009)
0.003*
(0.002)
0.017***
(0.000)
0.200***
(0.006)
-0.509***

-0.148***
(0.039)
-0.012**
(0.005)
-0.012***
(0.001)
0.279***
(0.019)
-0553***

Private
0.123***
(0.001)
0.051***
(0.000)
-0.005***
(0.000)
-0.216***
(0.001)
-0.014**
(0.006)
-0.032***
(0.012)
0.005**
(0.002)
-0.005***
(0.000)
0.106***
(0.003)
-0.625***

(0.043)

(0.005)

(0.045)

(0.006)

0.208

0.141

0.226

0.077

14,570

1,174,192

14,570

1,174,192

The table reports the optimal capital structure model regression results for long-term debt and total debt.
The optimal capital structure model is estimated separately for public and private firms. Besides regression
coefficients, standard errors are reported in brackets. Additionally, R2 and number of observations are shown.
*, ** and *** denote the statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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Using the estimated coefficients of the optimal capital structure model, we then predict
the firm’s target leverage and calculate the gap between the target and the actual leverage.
Figure 1 reveals that approximately one third of the firms operate with an optimal capital
structure meaning their actual leverage is less than 5 percentage point above or below the
optimum. Other firms operate with either lower or higher leverage than optimal, but as
can be noticed, there is a larger proportion of firms operating with leverage that is below
the optimum. The distribution thus reveals a rather conservative use of debt among the
public and private European firms.
Figure 1: Distribution of the differences between the target (optimal) leverage and the actual
leverage

The figure shows shares of public and private firms (in % of total firms) that have their actual leverage more than
five percentage points above the target leverage (red), approximately around the target leverage level (green) or
more than five percentage points below the target leverage (blue).

Further, we estimate the leverage adjustment speed. The leverage adjustment speed of the
public and private European firms are shown in Table 5 and 6, respectively. The results
suggest that public and private European firms adjust their leverage as predicted by the
dynamic trade-off theory. The leverage adjustment speed of the studied public firms is
estimated to 0.184 and 0.131 for long-term and total debt, respectively. Compared to
the adjustment speed of the public firms, we estimate slightly lower adjustment speeds
in private firms, 0.171 and 0.128 for long-term and total debt, respectively. That means
that public firms close on average 18.4% (13.1% if total debt is used) of the gap between
the actual and target leverage per year. The estimate for the private firms stands at 17.1%
(12.8% if total debt is used). The results are not surprising, as public firms are expected
to have lower adjustment costs than private firms. As expected, we also found the lower
adjustment speed for the total debt, as the short-term debt which is a component of
the total debt is a more volatile resource and thus more likely to depend on the firm’s
liquidity position than the long-term debt. That can add some distortion into the leverage
adjustment process and negatively affect the adjustment speed.
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Table 5: Leverage adjustment speed of public European firms
Long-term debt
(I)
LAS–total

(II)

Total debt
(III)

(IV)

0.184***
(0.007)

LAS–above target

0.144***

(0.014)

(0.013)

0.174***

0.116***

(0.020)
LAS–above/surplus

(0.015)
0.239***

0.169***

(0.015)
LAS–above/deficit

(0.015)

0.140***

0.115***

(0.018)
LAS–below/surplus

(0.017)

0.186***

0.066***

(0.026)
LAS–below/deficit

(0.012)

0.158***

0.162***

(0.019)
constant
R2
N

(VI)

(0.006)
0.191***

LAS–below target

(V)

0.131***

(0.019)

-0.006

-0.006

-0.006

-0.002

-0.000

0.00

(0.005)

(0.005)

(0.005)

(0.006)

(0.007)

(0.007)

0.104

0.104

0.108

0.095

0.095

0.101

11,470

The table reports the leverage adjustment speed of the public European firms estimated using partial
adjustment models outlined in equations (2), (3) and (5). Besides regression coefficients, standard errors are
reported in brackets. Additionally, R2 and the number of observations are shown. LAS is an abbreviation for
leverage adjustment speed. *, **, *** denote the statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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Table 6: Leverage adjustment speed of private European firms
Long-term debt
(I)
LAS–total

(II)

Total debt
(III)

(IV)

0.171***
(0.001)

LAS–above target

0.139***

(0.001)

(0.001)

0.158***

0.114***

(0.002)
LAS–above/surplus

(0.002)
0.234***

0.167***

(0.001)
LAS–above/deficit

(0.002)

0.091***

0.117***

(0.002)
LAS–below/surplus

(0.001)

0.167***

0.074***

(0.003)
LAS–below/deficit

(0.002)

0.142***

0.162***

(0.003)
constant
R2
N

-0.004***

(VI)

(0.001)
0.178***

LAS–below target

(V)

0.128***

-0.003***

(0.002)

-0.002***

-0.005***

-0.003***

-0.002***

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.001)

(0.001)

0.096

0.096

0.106

0.069

0.069

0.074

901,177

The table reports the leverage adjustment speeds of the private European firms estimated using partial
adjustment models outlined in equations (2), (3) and (5). Besides regression coefficients, standard errors are
reported in brackets. Additionally, R2 and the number of observations are shown. LAS is an abbreviation for
leverage adjustment speed. *, **, *** denote the statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.

Our estimates of the leverage adjustment speed are in line with the findings obtained in
similar studies that to a large extent address public US firms (Fama and French, 2002;
Kayhan and Titman, 2007; Flannery and Rangan, 2007; Byoun, 2008). Similar studies
that use the same estimation technique (OLS) report estimates of the leverage adjustment
speed on the interval 10-20%. However, the estimates of the leverage adjustment speed
tend to be higher–up to 30%–if alternative estimators, such as the fixed effect or mixed
effect model, are used (Flannery and Rangan, 2007; Byoun, 2008). Marinšek et al. (2016)
who use a mixed effect model, and Hanousek and Shamshur (2011) relying on a one-stage
partial adjustment model with fixed effects, estimate the leverage adjustment speed of the
studied European firms even higher. Their estimates are on the interval between 25-40%.
We found a significant asymmetry in the leverage adjustment speed. Our results show
that firms that operate with leverage that is above the optimal on average exhibit a higher
adjustment speed than the firms that are below optimally levered. The leverage adjustment
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speed estimates of the above optimally levered firms are between 10-25% higher than the
estimates for the below optimally levered firms for both, long-term and total debt. Byoun
(2008), for example, reports a slightly more pronounced asymmetry in the adjustment
speed between the above and below optimally levered public US firms.
Moreover, we documented significant effects of the firm’s cash flow imbalances. We
ascertained that the above optimally levered firms that have a financial surplus exhibit
a higher leverage adjustment speed. The result is consistent with the pecking-order
explanation and is in line with the results obtained by Byoun (2008). The differences
in the adjustment speed of the firms with a financial surplus and those with a financial
deficit are more evident in the models with the long-term debt, implying that the financial
surplus is being primarily used to lower the long-term debt. On the other hand, the
positive adjustment speed found for the above optimally levered firms with a financial
deficit point to the leverage adjustment consistent with the trade-off rationale (Strebulaev,
2007), according to which firms that have accumulated too much debt divest by selling
their assets or issue new equity to rebalance their capital structures. On the other hand,
we detected to some extent different capital structure dynamics for the below optimally
levered EU firms, when compared to the behaviour of the US public firms (as found by
Byoun, 2008). Our results show that the leverage adjustment speed for the long-term
debt is approximately 15% higher for the firms with a financial surplus in comparison
to those with a financial deficit. The obtained results are however consistent with the
trade-off theory, as well-performing firms that operate with large profits issue debt to take
advantage of the interest tax shield. Moreover, one can also infer that the supply of debt
impacts corporate capital structure decisions, as creditors are unwilling to enter in longterm relationship with the firms with insufficient probability of survival. For total debt
we found a significantly lower leverage adjustment speed for the firms with a financial
surplus than for those with a financial deficit, which indicates that the below optimally
levered firms with a financial deficit rely heavily on short-term financing that carries less
debt-related agency problems (Titman and Wessels, 1988). Again, both the pecking-order
and the trade-off theories should be considered when explaining the impact of financial
performance of firms on their leverage adjustment process.
Next, we estimate the leverage adjustment speed for private firms of different sizes. As seen
in Table 7 and Table 8, the leverage adjustment speed is on average negatively associated
with the size of the firms. It can be noticed that there are far the largest differences in the
leverage adjustment speed identified for the below optimally levered private firms. The
observed decrease in the leverage adjustment speeds between the group of the smallest
and the largest private firms of the below optimally levered private firms is approximately
60% (from 0.269 to 0.102) and 80% (from 0.225 to 0.043) for long -term and total debt,
respectively. However, the leverage adjustment speeds of the above optimally levered
private firms remain more stable along the groups of firms of different sizes (or slightly
increase with the size). Furthermore, the smallest group of the below optimally levered
private firms exhibits a higher adjustment speed than the smallest above optimally levered
private firms, indicating a certain level of aggression in the use of debt, a relatively low
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ability to control excessive leverage, pointing to a high risk taking appetite of those private
firms.9 The same phenomenon is not observed for larger private firms, as the above
optimally levered firms adjust faster towards the target leverage than the below optimally
levered firms. Even more, the asymmetries between the leverage adjustment speed of both
the above and below optimally levered private firms with more than 10 million EUR of
total assets are higher than those found for public firms. This leads us to the conclusion
that larger private firms are likely to be more risk averse than public firms in the capital
structure choice.
When estimating the impact of the firm’s cash flow imbalances on the leverage adjustment
speed, we notice that again both the pecking-order and the trade-off theories should be
used to explain the leverage adjustment process. As found for the sample of public and the
sample of private firms, a financial surplus enables the above optimally levered firms to
adjust their capital structure towards the target leverage faster than the firms operating with
a financial deficit. However, we found that the firm’s cash flows imbalances only marginally
impact the leverage adjustment speed of the below optimally levered private firms from
the two groups of the largest private firms, leading us to a conclusion that it is hard to
distinguish whether the pecking-order or the trade-off theory is the dominant explanation
for the leverage adjustment process of those firms. On the other hand, leverage dynamics is
much more interesting for the group of the smallest below optimally levered private firms.
We observe the below optimally levered private firms operating with a financial surplus
to have a higher leverage adjustment speed for long-term debt than the comparable firms
with a financial deficit (0.303 versus 0.220). The trade-off consistent leverage adjustment
process also points to a limited access to a long-term debt for the smallest private firms, as
the smallest below optimally levered private firms with a financial deficit rely mainly on
short-term debt financing.10

9 Additionally, Croci et al. (2011) argue that debt financing can be viewed as a non-control-diluting security for
family controlled firms, while those firms issue external equity only rarely. The majority of the smallest firms
from our sample are likely to be family controlled.
10 The leverage adjustment speed of the smallest below optimally levered private firms operating with a financial
deficit is 0.318, which is considerably higher in comparison to similar firms operating with a financial surplus,
which stands at 0.126.

0.111

(0.000)

0.000

(0.001)

0.198***

557,384

0.114

(0.001)

-0.003***

(0.005)

0.269***

(0.002)

0.171***

(II)

0.134

(0.001)

-0.002***

(0.006)

0.220***

(0.006)

0.303***

(0.003)

0.005***

(0.002)

0.239***

(III)

Total assets<10 million EUR

(I)

0.091

(0.001)

-0.008***

(0.002)

0.165***

(I)

289,141

0.092

(0.001)

-0.006***

(0.005)

0.135***

(0.003)

0.188***

(II)

0.095

(0.001)

-0.005***

(0.004)

0.133***

(0.005)

0.134***

(0.005)

0.145***

(0.003)

0.222***

(III)

10 million EUR<Total assets<100 million EUR

0.078

(0.002)

-0.015***

(0.003)

0.144***

54,652

0.082

(0.003)

-0.007***

(0.010)

0.102***

(0.011)

0.197***

(II)

0.084

(0.003)

-0.007***

(0.009)

0.114***

(0.011)

0.097***

(0.016)

0.227***

(0.008)

0.167***

(III)

Total assets>100 million EUR
(I)

The table reports the long-term debt adjustment speed of the private European firms divided into three groups using the firm’s total assets as a splitting criterion
estimated using partial adjustment models from equations (2), (3) and (5). Besides regression coefficients, standard errors are reported in brackets. Additionally,
R2 and the number of observations are shown. LAS is an abbreviation for leverage adjustment speed. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%,
respectively.

N

R2

constant

LAS – below/deficit

LAS – below/surplus

LAS – above/deficit

LAS – above/surplus

LAS – below target

LAS – above target

LAS – total

Size of the firm

Table 7: Long-term debt adjustment speed of private firms (by the value of the firm’s total assets)
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0.088

557,384

0.090

-0.006***
(0.001)

-0.000

(0.004)

0.225***

(0.002)

0.129***

(0.001)

(0.001)

0.160***

(II)

0.099

(0.001)

-0.003***

(0.005)

0.318***

(0.004)

0.126***

(0.002)

0.117***

(0.002)

0.154***

(III)

Total assets<10 million EUR

(I)

0.056

(0.001)

-0.009***

(0.001)

0.107***

(I)

289,141

0.058

(0.001)

-0.005***

(0.003)

0.081***

(0.003)

0.132***

(II)

0.062

(0.001)

-0.004***

(0.003)

0.102***

(0.003)

0.067***

(0.003)

0.093***

(0.003)

0.176***

(III)

10 million EUR<Total assets<100 million EUR

0.051

(0.002)

-0.019***

(0.002)

0.099***

54,652

0.068

(0.002)

-0.003

(0.005)

0.043***

(0.009)

0.231***

(II)

0.069

(0.002)

-0.003

(0.005)

0.042***

(0.005)

0.045***

(0.011)

0.200***

(0.012)

0.266***

(III)

Total assets>100 million EUR
(I)

The table reports the total debt adjustment speed of the private European firms divided into three groups using the firm’s total assets as a splitting criterion estimated
using the partial adjustment models from equations (2), (3) and (5). Besides the regression coefficients, standard errors are reported in brackets. Additionally, R2
and the number of observations are shown. LAS is an abbreviation for the leverage adjustment speed. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%,
respectively.

N

R2

Constant

LAS – below/deficit

LAS – below/surplus

LAS – above/deficit

LAS – above/surplus

LAS – below target

LAS – above target

LAS – total

Size of the firm

Table 8: Total debt adjustment speed of private firms (by the value of the firm’s total assets)
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Additionally, we test how the leverage adjustment speed of the European firms has changed
since the emergence of the financial crisis in the year of 2008.
Table 9: Impact of the recent financial crisis on the total leverage adjustment speed
Long-term debt
Public
LAS

0.185***
(0.011)

LAS * crisis

-0.001
(0.14)

crisis

0.004*
(0.003)

constant
R2
N

-0.006

Private
0.191***
(0.001)
-0.033***
(0.002)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.004***

Total debt
Public
0.165***
(0.010)
-0.055***
(0.011)
0.006**
(0.003)
-0.002

Private
0.137***
(0.001)
-0.015***
(0.001)
-0.004***
(0.000)
-0.005***

(0.005)

(0.000)

(0.006)

(0.000)

0.104

0.097

0.098

0.069

11,470

901,177

11,470

901,177

The table reports the impact of the recent financial crisis on the leverage adjustment speed estimated using
the partial adjustment model from equation (2) with the inclusion of a dummy variable Dtcrisis. Besides
the regression coefficients, standard errors are reported in brackets. Additionally, R2 and the number of
observations are shown. LAS is an abbreviation for leverage adjustment speed. *, **, *** denote statistical
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.

Not least, we estimate the effect of the financial crisis on the leverage adjustment speed.
As can be observed in Table 10, we found a statistically significant reduction in all
leverage adjustment speeds in the years during the recent financial crisis, however, with
only one exception, namely the long-term debt adjustment speed for public firms which
is statistically insignificant. The results are in line with the findings obtained by Cook
and Tang (2010), Dang et al. (2014) and Marinšek et al. (2016), and suggest that market
timing factors interact with the forces proposed by the other two capital structure theories
when European firms make capital structure decisions. To better understand the leverage
dynamics following the beginning of the crisis, we again study the above and below
optimally levered firms separately.
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Table 10: Impact of the recent financial crisis on leverage adjustment speeds (disintegration)
Long-term debt
LAS – above target

Public

Private

Public

0.235***

0.211***

0.223***

(0.020)
LAS – above/crisis

-0.071***
(0.027)

LAS – below target

0.116***
(0.032)

LAS – below/crisis

0.097**
(0.041)

crisis

-0.003
(0.004)

constant
R2
N

Total debt

-0.001

(0.002)
-0.051***
(0.003)
0.161***

(0.019)
-0.133***
(0.022)
0.095***

Private
0.149
(0.002)
-0.017
(0.003)
0.122

(0.004)

(0.025)

(0.003)

-0.004

0.039

-0.014

(0.006)

(0.033)

(0.004)

-0.002***
(0.000)

-0.004

(0.005)

(0.001)

0.006

-0.003

(0.006)

(0.000)

(0.007)

(0.001)

0.106

0.097

0.102

0.070

11,470

-0.002***

-0.003

901,177

11,470

901,177

The table reports the impact of the recent financial crisis on the leverage adjustment speeds of the above
and below optimally levered firms estimated using the partial adjustment model from equation (3) with
the inclusion of a dummy variable Dtcrisis. Besides the regression coefficients, standard errors are reported in
brackets. Additionally, R2 and the number of observations are shown. LAS is an abbreviation for leverage
adjustment speed. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.

The results in Table 10 reveal much more complex changes than initially expected in
the leverage adjustment speed following the emergence of the crisis. We do not find the
leverage adjustment speed of the below optimally levered public firms to fall, which signals
that these firms retain in their leverage choice during the crisis as much manoeuvring
space as they had before the crisis. What is more, the below optimally levered public firms
manage to increase their leverage adjustment speed for the long-term debt during the
crisis. This might be a consequence of the reduction in interest rates that first resulted
from the flight to quality in some countries and the expansionary monetary policy, and/or
a consequence of the shift in creditors’ preferences and risk taking. On the other hand, we
observe a statistically significant reduction of the total debt adjustment speed of the below
optimally levered private firms, while a decrease in the long-term debt adjustment speed
of the same firms is found to be statistically insignificant. Our results show that the below
optimally levered private firms experience more restrictions in their debt choice during
distressed period than public firms. However, these limitations should be viewed as less
important.
The leverage adjustment speed of the above optimally levered firms are reduced for all
firms during the crisis period, which confirms the findings of Dang et al. (2014) that the
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impact of the financial crisis on leverage adjustment speeds is asymmetric, with financially
constrained firms being more adversely affected. While the decrease in the long-term
debt adjustment speed is at around 25% when compared to the pre-crisis levels for both
the above optimally levered public and private firms, the total debt adjustment speed is
sharply reduced for the above optimally levered public firms and only marginally for the
above optimally levered private firms, which is a rather unexpected outcome. For that
reason, we also look at the profitability of the above optimally levered firms and notice that
the median above optimally levered public firm was more profitable in the years before
the crisis than the comparable private firm, while the opposite is true for the crisis period.
Additionally, following the market timing theory of capital structure (Baker and Wurgler,
2002) or the dynamic pecking-order theory (Bessler et al., 2011), firms tend to issue new
equity capital when share prices are high and the relative level of information asymmetry
is low. As the European stock markets declined sharply during the crisis, we assume that
the public firms’ propensities to issue new equity capital with the purpose of lowering their
(short-term) leverage also decreased in the same time period.11
6

CONCLUSION

Our research paper looks into a large sample of the European public and private firms
that have received significantly less attention in the existing literature and examine their
capital structure choice. We estimate an empirical model that is based on a unified setting
in which leverage targets remain consistent with the dynamic trade-off theory, while the
leverage adjustment process depends on the interacting effects proposed by different
capital structure theories. We estimate the leverage adjustment speed and point at factors
that explain the differences in the leverage dynamics.
We find strong empirical evidence that the European firms adjust their leverage towards
the optimal capital structure and that both public and private firms have a similar leverage
adjustment speed. The above optimally levered firms are found to adjust faster than
the below optimally levered firms, while the impact of the firm’s cash flow imbalances
on the leverage adjustment process should be studied from both the trade-off and the
pecking-order perspectives. The acquired results imply that private firms should have very
similar adjustment costs and rebalance their capital structures as often as the public firms.
Analysing private firms further, our results show that private firms represent a very diverse
group of firms and that the size of the firm is a far more important factor that determines
the capital structure dynamics than its public/private status. Somewhat in contrast to our
expectations, we ascertain that smaller firms adjust their leverage towards the target faster
than larger firms. Moreover, we observe the opposite asymmetry in the adjustment speed
in the group of the smallest firms compared to the asymmetry found in the larger firms.
11 Taking into account all of our results, we additionally argue that the low asymmetry between the leverage
adjustment speed of the above and below optimally levered firms reported in the Tables 5 and 6 might be a
consequence of the recent financial crisis, as the above optimally levered firms experience a more pronounced
reduction in leverage adjustment speeds during the period of stress than the below optimally levered firms.
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Analysing the group of the smallest firms, we find that the adjustment speed of the bellow
optimally levered firms exceeds the adjustment speed of the above optimally levered firms.
Analysing the effect of the recent financial crisis, we document a reduction in the leverage
adjustment speed for all firms on average. By disintegrating the total leverage adjustment
speed into two components (separate estimations for the above and below optimally
levered firms), we notice much more complex changes in the leverage adjustment speed
than expected, with the above optimally levered firms being more adversely impacted than
the below optimally levered firms.
Our findings have several important implications, as , on the one hand, they confirm
the robustness of the dynamic trade-off theory outside the context of the US large public
firms, and on the other hand, that including the interactive effects proposed by alternative
capital structure theories can substantially contribute to the understanding of the complex
leverage adjustment process. By incorporating parts of the pecking-order and the market
timing related logic in the dynamic trade-off theory framework, we were able to better
explain the leverage adjustment process compared to the explanation that would be
obtained relying solely on the trade-off theory rationale. What is probably more important
and goes beyond the test of the theory robustness is that the results imply that the idea of
an optimal capital structure is not relevant only in large but also small firms. The results of
our research show the optimal capital structure could prove even more important.
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